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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ground that, if the issue of lack of knowledge is raised by the pleadings
or evidence, it is error for the court to fail to instruct the jury that
defendants would not be guilty unless they had knowledge of the pres-
ence of the liquor in the automobile. It should be noted, however, that
the court qualified the statements it had made in State v. Welch on the
guilty knowledge issue by declaring that the state made out a prima
facie case of guilty knowledge when it proved that there was more than
one gallon of liquor in an automobile in the possession of and operated
by the defendant. Thus, if the defendant wishes to avail himself of
lack of guilty knowledge as a defense, he incurs the burden of procuring
and offering evidence to establish that fact.16
TENCH C. COXE, III.
Deeds-Conveyance to the Heirs of a Living Person
By the common law, if an owner of land in fee simple attempted to
convey a life estate or an estate in tail, with a remainder to the grantor's
heirs, the remainder was void and a reversion was created by operation
of law.' If, however, the grantor sufficiently indicated that "heirs"
meant a class of remaindermen different from his heirs general, the rule
had no application. 2 The application of this rule meant that the grantor
might subsequently defeat his heirs by conveying the property in ques-
tion to other persons. The reasons given for the rule were: (1) the
maxim that there can be no heirs of a living person,3 and (2) the
reluctance to deprive the grantor's overlord of certain feudal rights
which attached only if the property passed by descent. 4  At common
law the rule was applied as a strict rule of property,3 as e.g., the Rule
" For a discussion of the wisdom of submitting a case to the jury on the
strength of a presumption, see McCormick, Charges on Presumptions and Burdens
of Proof, 5 N. C. L. REV. 291, 302 (1927). For a recent general discussion of
presumptions, see Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, 16 So. CALIF.
L. REv. 245 (1943).
1 Godolphin v. Abington, 2 Atk. 57, 26 Eng. Reprint 432 (1740); Doctor v.
Hughes, 225 N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919); Therrell v. Clanton, 210 N. C.
391, 186 S. E. 483 (1936).
See Thompson v. Batts, 168 N. C. 333, 335, 84 S. E. 347, 348 (1915). In
Campbell v. Everhart, 139 N. C. 503, 510, 52 S. E. 201, 203 (1905), the court
stated, ". . . but it was likewise the rule in regard to a deed that, if anything
appeared on its face to indicate that the grantor used the word 'heirs' as designailo
personarum, or if a preceding estate was created so as to make the limitation to
the heirs of the living person a contingent remainder depending for its vesting
upon the event of the death of the ancestor before the life estate terminated, the
word 'heirs' was construed to mean 'children.'"
'Whitley v. Arenson, 219 N. C. 121, 124, 12 S. E. 2d 906, 909 (1941). "'Heir'
and 'ancestor' are correlative terms. There can be no heir without an ancestor.
Hence, there can be no heirs of the living, nemo est haeres viventis. One may be
heir apparent or heir presumptive, yet he is not an heir, during the life of the
ancestor. Consequently, under the strictness of the old law, a limitation to the
heirs of a living person was void for want of a grantee."
'I SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS §145 (1936).
'See Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N. Y. 305, 306, 122 N. E. 221 (1919).
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in Shelley's case; but the precise nature of the rule in this country is
uncertain. 6 The common law rule has been recognized in North Caro-
lina and has been applied as a positive rule of property.7
In a recent North Carolina case8 the grantor, after reserving a life
estate, conveyed to her son for life, and at his death to his issue sur-
viving, with the further limitation that if he die without issue, then to
the living heirs of the grantor. The court did not invoke the common
law rule; instead, they applied N. C. GEN. STAT. §41-6 which reads:
"A limitation by deed, will or other writing to the heirs of a living per-
son, shall be construed to be the children of such person, unless a con-
trary intention appear by the deed or will." The court decided that there
was a contingent remainder in the children of the grantor.
It seems to be well settled that the statute is not applicable where
there is a precedent estate conveyed to the living person.9 The pri-
mary reason for establishing such a restriction to the application of the
statute was to preserve the Rule in Shelley's case.'0 Absent this situa-
tion, however, the statute is generally applicable, regardless of whether
the limitation is to the heirs of the grantor" or to the heirs of a third
person.12 The argument of counsel in the principal case that a life
estate reserved was comparable to a precedent estate conveyed was not
sustained, indicating an emphasis on the precedent estate conveyed.
The statute also is inapplicable if the grantor expresses in the in-
strument an intention that the word "heirs" is used in a sense contrary
to that of "children." However, great difficulty may be encountered in
trying to determine the grantor's true intention. In Therrell v. Clan-
'I SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS §147 (1936).
7 Therrell v. Clanton, 210 N. C. 391, 186 S. E. 483 (1936) ; Note, 15 N. C. L.
REv. 59 (1936).
'Ellis v. Barnes, 231 N. C. 543, 57 S. E. 2d 772 (1950).
'Bank v. Snow, 221 N. C. 14, 18 S. E. 2d 711 (1942) ; Whitley v. Arenson,
219 N. C. 121, 12 S. E. 2d 906 (1941) ; Jones v. Ragsdale, 141 N. C. 200, 53 S. E.
842 (1906) ; Marsh v. Griffin, 136 N. C. 333, 48 S. E. 735 (1904).
10 Starnes v. Hill, 112 N. C. 1, 16 S. E. 1011 (1893) (court held that the
statute did not alter or abolish the Rule in Shelley's case). In Marsh v. Griffin,
136 N. C. 333, 334, 48 S. E. 735 (1904), the court says the statute applies
"... only when there is no precedent estate conveyed to said living person, else
it would not only repeal the Rule in Shelley's case, but would pervert every con-
veyance to 'A and his heirs' into something entirely different from what those
words have always been understood to mean." However, consider the case where
the conveyance is to A for life, then in trust to the heirs of A. Under the rule
set forth by the court the statute is inapplicable; yet the Rule in Shelley's case
is also inapplicable.
11 Thompson v. Batts, 168 N. C. 333, 84 S. E. 347 (1915). The grantor, in
contemplation of his second marriage executed a deed to his intended wife con-
veying to her for life, remainder to her issue of such marriage, and on failure of
such issue to revert to the heirs of the grantor; held, N. C. GEN. STAT. §41-6 is
applicable and the children of the grantor have a contingent remainder.
12 Campbell v. Everhart, 139 N. C. 503, 52 S. E. 201 (1905) (conveyance
directly to the heirs of a third person, with no intervening estate being conveyed).
Smith v. Brison, 90 N. C. 284 (1884) (an intervening estate was conveyed, but
the ultimate limitation was to the heirs of a third party).
1950]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tonl 3 the grantor conveyed to A (only child of grantor, and her hus-
band for their joint lives with remainder to A's children of such
marriage; if no such children, then in fee simple to the "right heirs" of
the grantor. Instead of the statute, the court applied the common law
rule, evidently because it thought the grantor, by using the words "right
heirs" in that context, had sufficiently expressed an intention that
"heirs" was not to mean "children."' 4 By so doing the court defeated
the grantor's apparent intent to convey the property to his collateral
heirs. Likewise, it seems that the statute would be inapplicable in the
case of a direct conveyance to the heirs of a living person who has no
children,1 5 for the fact that there are no children should be sufficient to
indicate that the grantor used the word "heirs" in a sense contrary to
that of "children."
The effect of N. C. GEN. STAT. §41-6 seems to be that the pre-
sumption arising from the use of the word "heirs" is changed. 16 For,
at the common law, where the limitation was simply to the heirs of a
living person, nothing else appearing, the presumption was that "heirs"
meant "heirs general" thereby creating a reversion in the grantor (if to
the heirs of the grantor) or else invalidating the limitation for lack of a
grantee (if to the heirs of a third person). Now, by virtue of the statute,
a limitation to the "heirs" of a living person, nothing else appearing, is
presumed to mean "children." However, both at the common law and
under the statute the presumptions are capable of being rebutted by the
grantor's expressing a contrary intention in the instrument.
Where the statute, however, is inapplicable either (1) because the
living person has no children or (2) because the grantor expresses an
intention to the contrary, it is likely, on the basis of Therrell v. Clanton,
that the court will resort to the common law to reach a solution to the
problem. By so doing it seems that the court is applying a rule without
a reason, the reason for the rule having vanished.' 7 It also appears
that the court is defeating the intention of the grantor, for where the
grantor expressly conveys an estate, his intention may be inferred to
be that the conveyance should be given full effect.18 The common law
"210 N. C. 391, 186 S. E. 483 (1936) ; Note, 15 N. C. L. REv. 59, 61 (1936).
"It is possible that the court overlooked N. C. GEN. STAT. §41-6, for it was
not mentioned in the decision. However, it seems more probable that the court
considered the statute but found it inapplicable, for the reason that if the statute
were applied, the conveyance, in effect, would be to A for life, remainder to A's
children, and if no children then to A.
" If the statute were applied where there was a direct conyevance (no inter-
vening estate being conveyed) to the heirs of a living person who had no children,
it seems that the conveyance would be void because it is a class gift, and there
are no members of the class in existence at the time the conveyance is to take
effect.
"See Campbell v. Everhart, 139 N. C. 503, 510, 52 S. E. 201, 203 (1905).
"'I SimEs, FUTURE INTERESTS §147 (1936).
"1 See 4, FOURTH REPORT MADE To His MAJESTY BY THE COMMISSIONERS,
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rule was considered so objectionable in England that a statute was
passed in 1833 which abolished the rule'9 and permitted the heirs of a
living person to take as purchasers. This method of dealing with the
rule has also been suggested by the American Law Institute.2 °
An addition to N. C. GEN. STAT. §41-6 permitting the heirs of a
living person to take as purchasers where the grantor indicates that
"heirs" does not mean "children" would allow the grantor's intention
to be carried out and avoid the harshness of the common law rule.
THOMAS M. MOORE.
Federal Courts-Venue-Transfer of Actions Under
§1404(a) of New Judicial Code
Section 1404(a) 1 incorporates into the new Judicial Code2 the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens,3 but rather than requiring dismissal,
permits transfer to a more convenient forum even though the venue of
the original forum be proper. 4 The lower federal courts, however, have
not agreed in construing and administering the new subsection, and all
of the resulting conflicting views have not yet been resolved by the
Supreme Court.5
(A). One question causing difficulty is whether a plaintiff, the party
choosing the forum in the first instance, can invoke §1404(a) to trans-
fer his action to a district where a defendant is not amenable to process.
Of the four cases found in which the problem was considered, two
federal district courts have denied plaintiffs the use of §1404(a),O while
APPOINTED TO ENQUIRE INTO THE LAW OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL PRoPERTY
74 (1833), reprinted in LEAcH, CASES ON FuTuRm INTERESTs 3 (2d ed. 1940),
Therrell v. Clanton, 210 N. C. 391, 186 S. E. 483 (1936) ; Note, 15 N. C. L. Rxv.
59 (1936).
1" STAT. 3 & 4 Wm. IV, c. 106 §3 (1833).
2' UNIFORM PRoPERTY AcT §15. "When any property is limited, in an other-
wise effective conveyance inter vivos, in form or in effect, to the heirs or next
of kin of the conveyor, which conveyance creates one or more prior interests in
favor of a person or persons in existence, such conveyance operates in favor of
such heirs or next of kin by purchase and not by descent."
1 "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought."
Title 28 U. S. C. (Supp. 1949). Effective September 1, 1948.
' For a discussion of this doctrine see Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal
Forum, 60 HARv. L. REv. 908 (1947); Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Con-
veniens, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 380 (1947).
'28 U. S. C. §1404(a), Reviser's Notes at 802-03 (Supp. 1949). This sub-
section should not be confused with §1406(a) which, in a situation where the
original venue is improper, gives the court the alternative of dismissing the action
or transferring it to a proper venue.
One question, whether §1404(a) applies to actions governed by special venue
provisions, appears to have been settled in the affirmative. See Note, 28 N. C. L.
REV. 100 (1949).
' Bolten v. General Motors Corp., 81 F. Supp. 851 (N. D. Ill. 1949) (personal
injury, diversity suit) ; Barnhart v. J. B. Rogers Producing Co., 86 F. Supp. 595
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